Constitutional Criminal Procedure by Baker, Thomas E.
Florida International University College of Law 
eCollections 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
1982 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
Thomas E. Baker 
Florida International University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas E. Baker, Constitutional Criminal Procedure , 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1083 (1982). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications/167 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, 
please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
? ???? ?????
Citation: 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1083 1981-1982 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Fri Oct  9 12:39:11 2015
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0025-987X
Constitutional Criminal Procedure
by Thomas E. Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses decisions of the new Eleventh Circuit and also
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit, some of which are binding prece-
dents for the new court.' By way of introduction, the title Constitutional
Criminal Procedure deserves amplification. Related criminal law topics
not within the scope of this article include the following: the substantive
law of crimes;' nonconstitutional aspects of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence;s nonconstitutional aspects of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure;4 procedural aspects of habeas corpus;5 sentencing;6 prisoners'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. Florida State Uni-
versity (B.S., 1974); University of Florida, Holland Law Center (J.D., 1977). Member of the
State Bar of Florida. Special thanks go to Professor Charles P. Bubany who read drafts of
this article and made many helpful suggestions.
1. In the first case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
the en banc court held that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit on or before September 30,
1981, would be binding precedent in the new court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The new court reserved decision on the precedential impact
of other categories of former Fifth Circuit precedent; for example, decisions handed down
after September 30, 1981, in cases submitted prior to the date of division and also of
postdivision en banc decisions. Thus, counsel are cautioned to pay close attention to the
date of the decision of former Fifth Circuit precedents. See generally Baker, Precedent
Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 S.W.L.J. 687 (1981).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 649 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bow-
man, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 649 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Robin-
son, 635 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3050 (1981).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Metz, 652 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Law,
633 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2332 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Cerrella v. Hanberry, 650 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending); Torna
v. Wainwright, 649 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending). While habeas corpus is nomi-
nally classifiable as a civil proceeding, these cases normally arise in a postconviction context.
Therefore, while procedural aspects of the Great Writ are beyond the scope of this article,
relevant decisions will be discussed on the merits.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Small, 636 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1981).
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rights;7 and civil rights suits alleging constitutional deprivations.8  Thu,
eliminated are the substantive constitutional protections.9 Nor is the en-
tire area of constitutional criminal procedure detailed here. Of the
twenty-three individual rights guaranteed in the first eight amendment,
to the Constitution, twelve relate to criminal procedure. As a consequence
of the founding fathers' emphasis, which has been carried forward by the
judicial activism of the last two decades, constitutional criminal proce-
dure predominates the workload of the courts of appeal. During the sur-
vey period,10 the court" decided more than three hundred appeals in thiE
area. A gross grouping of these decisions furnishes the following subtopic,
for this article: Arrests; Searches and Seizures; Self-Incriminations:
Double Jeopardy; and Right to Counsel. This article mirrors the court',.
1981 docket. If only in a "footnoteworthy" way, the court did deal with
other traditional constitutional criminal procedure topics such as entrap-
ment," pretrial and trial identifications, " grand jury procedures," the
right to a speedy trial, 5 discovery,16 guilty pleas," the right to jury trial,"
7. See, e.g., Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981); Pace v. Oliver, 634 F.2d 30
(5th Cir. 1981).
8. See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Vance, 631
F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981).
9. The omission of substantive guarantees is not to be taken as denigration. One cate-
gory of cases demonstrates the significance of this omission. Of the 813 persons on deat
row, 478 are imprisoned in the six states that comprised the former Fifth Circuit. 1 DEATS
PENALTY RPTR. 18 (August 1981). As a result, the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits will pla5
a critical role in interpreting the substantive protections of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. However significant, survey decisions in this area are not within the purview ol
this article. See, e.g., Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Balkcom, 66C
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981); Francioni v.
Wainwright, 650 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1981); Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1981);
Terrbonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d
1364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 27 (1981).
10. January 1, 1981, to December 31, 1981.
11. The generic reference "the court" will be used throughout the remainder of this arti-
cle. "The court" is the appropriate reference to both the entire court of appeals and a par-
ticular division or panel. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 241
(1953). When relevant, consideration by the en banc court will be distinguished from a
three-judge panel.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Crossman, 663 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Bazan, 637 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
2335 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Guice v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 643 F.2d 22C
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v,
Wilson, 657 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Greer, 655 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
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and the right to confrontation. 19 The subtopics selected were, however,
the principal areas of concern during the survey period for the litigants,
the attorneys, and the court. Faced with so many decisions in a divergent
and complex area of law, what follows is a survey that, perhaps in-
evitably, cannot claim the comprehensiveness of these introductory
disclaimers.
II. ARRESTS
Appeals challenging arrests-fourth amendment seizures of per-
sons-raise three essential issues. First, the court must determine when a
police-citizen contact rises to the level of a constitutional encroachment.
Second, the court must evaluate the sufficiency of the factual basis for a
contact of constitutional proportion. Third, the court must analyze the
appropriateness of the procedures that the government actors followed.
During the survey period, the court considered each of these issues, which
here are discussed in turn.
The Fifth Circuit consistently has noted the absence of a definitive
standard from the Supreme Court for determining when a police-citizen
contact rises to the level of a constitutional encroachment.10 In two re-
16. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 662 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981); Sellers v. Estelle, 651 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1981);
Ogle v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Block, 660 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Jackson, 659 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1981); Ehl v. Estelle, 656 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1981); Hill v.
Estelle, 653 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1981); Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc); United States v. Broussard, 645 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Bryan, 645 F.2d 331
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Law, 633 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2332
(1981). See also note 251 infra.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Mobley, 656 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1981); Huffman v. Wainwright, 651
F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981); Bronstein
v. Wainwright, 646 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1981); Braxton v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.
1981).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 655 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Henao, 652 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1981); Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272
(5th Cir. 1981).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 984 (5th
Cir. 1981). But cf. United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 462-64 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 2325 (1981) (suggesting that definitive standards are set forth by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 496 U.S. 544 (1980)). See generally Com-
ment, Criminal Profiles After United States v. Mendenhall: How Well-Founded a
Suspicion?, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 557.
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cent cases concerning drug courier profiles, the Supreme Court explored
the limits of the fourth amendment only to stop short of drawing it,
boundaries. In United States v. Mendenhall,2 a Supreme Court majorit
held there was no fourth amendment violation when drug agents ap-
proached defendant in an airport after defendant had satisfied a numbel
of characteristics in the agents' drug courier profile.2 2 The majority could
not agree on a rationale. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist concluded thai
the federal agents' initial approach was not a fourth amendment seizure.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
concurred in the result but declined to reach the issue, assuming instead
that a seizure had occurred which was justified on the facts. Justice-
White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented from the decision, as-
suming also that defendant had been seized, but concluding that there
was insufficient suspicion for the seizure. The second recent Supreme
Court case, Reid v. Georgia,23 is noteworthy for its similarity to Menden-
hall both on its facts and in its lack of certainty. The Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment was violated because the profile charac-
teristics that the agents relied upon were insufficient constitutionally.
The issue of whether the initial police-citizen contact was of a constitu-
tional dimension had not been addressed by the state court and simply
was not reached by the Supreme Court. Noting this inability of the Su-
preme Court to provide a framework for analysis, the Fifth Circuit ap-
plied its own precedent during the survey period.2 4
The case that has emerged as the leading Fifth Circuit precedent for
determining when a police-citizen contact rises to the level of a constitu-
tional encroachment-is United States v. Elmore.2 5 Elmore established
21. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). The Supreme Court opinions are analyzed carefully in United
States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980).
22. A "drug courier profile" has been defined as "a somewhat informal compilation of
characteristics believed to be typical of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics." Reid v. Geor-
gia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980). Since many of the characteristics are consistent with com-
pletely innocent behavior, the utility of these profiles as a basis for a constitutional contact
has been questioned. Id. at 441; United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 984 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1978).
23. 448 U.S. at 438.
24. A Supreme Court answer may be forthcoming. See Royer v. Florida, 389 So. 2d 1007
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), cert. granted, [1981] 30 CRiM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 4109.
25. 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). In United States v.
Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 532 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980), the court suggested that the Elmore analysis
had been eroded by United States v. Santora, 619 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 954 (1980). Subsequent opinions seem to have shored up the precedent. See United
States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211
(5th Cir. 1980). Certainly, decisions during the survey period testify to the preeminence of
the Elmore analysis. See text accompanying notes 25-42 infra. The court's decision to re-
hear en banc United States v. Berry, 649 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1981), may suggest that the
[Vol. 321086
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three categories of police-citizen contacts: encounters, stops, and arrests.
During the survey period, the court struggled with this threshold classifi-
cation, which may be understood only within the factual context of the
cases.
Police-citizen contacts of the third kind-arrests-are at one end of the
fourth amendment spectrum. If a traditional arrest occurs, the seizure is
constitutionally infirm unless the arresting officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect is guilty of a specific violation of the law.2 6 The
arrest paradigm, in which a person is taken physically into custody, leaves
little room for doubt with regard to timing.27 The fourth amendment is-
sue then becomes whether the arresting officer had the requisite probable
cause.28 Police-citizen contacts of the first kind-mere encounters-are at
the opposite end of the fourth amendment spectrum. An encounter is an
incident of "personal intercourse between police and citizens which may
be for investigative purposes but which [is] not [a restraint] on the citi-
zen's liberty and which thus [is] not encompassed by the fourth amend-
ment. ' '29  Since there is no constitutional encroachment, encounters of
this type need not be based on any particular level of suspicion.3 0 The
difficult constitutional line-drawing entails distinguishing police-citizen
contacts of the second kind-stops-from mere encounters. A stop is a
"[restraint] of [a citizen] which [is] less than [an arrest] but which never-
theless trigger[s] fourth amendment scrutiny. . . ."" In other words, ar-
rests and stops are "seizures" for fourth amendment purposes and en-
counters are not. The Fifth Circuit has noted that "the determination of
whether [a seizure has occurred] often requires a 'refined judgment,' espe-
cially when no force, physical restraint, or blatant show of authority is
involved. '3 2 In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart proposed the following objec-
tive test for distinguishing between seizures and mere encounters: "[A]
Elmore analysis will be rethought; cf. United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir.
1981) (Randall, J., dissenting) (stating that Elmore is still controlling law in the Fifth Cir-
cuit). See also United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1167 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981).
26. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) and United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980)).
27. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
But see Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
28. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. Id. at 357. See also text accompanying notes 44-51 infra.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 308 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 647 F.2d 588, 591 (5th
Cir. 1981).
31. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1981).
32. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 308 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams,
647 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1981)
(appeal pending); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
108719821
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person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendmen
only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."'
The Fifth Circuit already had embraced implicitly the reasonable persol
test in Elmore" and has applied it in several survey period decisions3 " 1
the course of these decisions, the Fifth Circuit has placed its imprimatu:
on what might be called the "Markonni modus operandi," named for thi
Atlanta-based drug enforcement agent who has figured in a host of thl
leading cases.36 It appears from all of these decisions that the police ma!
approach a citizen in an airport, identify themselves, request identifica
tion or an airline ticket, and briefly question the individual with his per
mission about travel plans, ownership of luggage, and traveling compan
ions. As long as the district court in the first instance and the court o.
appeals on review of the record determine that a reasonable person woulc
have believed he was free to go, the police-citizen contact is to be deemec
a mere encounter and beneath the fourth amendment threshold.37 In
decision remanding the case to the district court for the initial totality-of.
the-circumstances determination, the court identified several "mattern
which would be relevant": 8s  (1) whether the area of the contact was s(
private that the citizen felt isolated; (2) whether the officers were uni.
formed and how many there were; (3) whether the physical location of th(
officers and their body language indicated that the citizen was not free tc
go if he did not wish to answer the officers' questions; and (4) whether th(
questions or the manner in which they were asked was intimidating, accu-
33. 446 U.S. at 554. This approach may be the one all of the Justices have taken. Justic
Powell, in his concurring opinion, noted that he did "not necessarily disagree." Id. at 560 nA
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice White, writing for the dissenters, observed that whether s
seizure has occurred is a "fact-bound question with a totality-of-circumstances assessmen
that is best left in the first instance to the trial court .... " Id. at 569. See also note 24
supra.
34. 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980); see United States v.
Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 984-85 n.1
(5th Cir. 1981).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wil-
liams, 647 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1981)
(appeal pending); United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1981).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 910 (1980).
37. United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Smith, 649
F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal
pending); United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berd, 634
F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 899 (5th Cir. 1981).
1088 [Vol. 3.'
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satory, or persistent."' These factors must be considered to decide if the
citizen is "restrained in any way or . .. his or her cooperation is . ..
obtained by coercion, force or other use of authority."40 Still, the empha-
sis is on the impact of verbal exchange. One of Agent Markonni's ploys
was to suggest that a person who was not engaged in criminal activity
should be willing to consent to a search."" While not alone dispositive,
such "offensive statements" as unsupported accusations of criminal activ-
ity or suggestions that an innocent person would be willing to waive con-
stitutional rights are relevant to the analysis.42
Distinguishing between stops, which are fourth amendment seizures,
and encounters, which are not, may seem solely a matter of semantics,
but examples of each category exist even though fine lines are difficult to
draw. United States v. Pena-Cantu"s concerned a police-citizen contact
that exceeded the de minimis intrusiveness of an encounter and became a
seizure of constitutional proportion. In Pena-Cantu, agents of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service spotted two automobiles suspected of
carrying illegal aliens. Four agents in two unmarked vehicles followed the
suspicious automobiles until they stopped. The agents parked directly be-
hind the vehicles, identified themselves, and stood on both sides of the
vehicle while they questioned the driver and the passengers concerning
their citizenship. The court, applying the Elmore objective standard, had
no trouble concluding that a reasonable person would not feel free to
leave.
The second essential issue in an arrest is whether there is a sufficient
factual basis to support a police-citizen contact of constitutional propor-
tion. The requisite factual basis must increase in certainty as the contact
becomes more invasive. An arrest must be supported by probable cause;
an investigative stop need only be supported by a reasonable supicion; a
mere encounter requires no significant basis whatsoever.
During the survey period, the court repeated a working definition of
probable cause:
[P]robable cause exists whenever the facts and circumstances known
to the officer, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed. The currency of probable cause
is probability, not legal certainty; it may exist even though the evidence
39. Id.
40. United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hill,
626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1981).
43. 639 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1981).
1982] 1089
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before the officer is insufficient to convict."
Even though the controlling principles may be so broadly stated, thei
application is narrowly fact-bound. Indeed, "the decision in one case sel
dom furnishes a pat answer in another." 5 Two generalizations may b,
distilled from the surveyed cases. First, the case is rare in which thl
court is unable to conclude that probable cause supported the arrest.4
Second, the court continues to place an almost excessive emphasis on thi
expertise of the arresting officer in order to find probable cause for war
rantless arrests.' These generalizations may be explained by the realiza
tion that the probable cause standard of the fourth amendment is applie(
to data in arrests of suspects in a way that is markedly different fron
searches for evidence or contraband.4
8
For less intrusive seizures-investigative stops-the Supreme Court ex
plicitly has recognized an exception to the fourth amendment require
ment of probable cause. The articulable facts known to the stoppin
officer must establish only a reasonable suspicion that the stopped citizei
is involved in criminal activity.50 Whereas the probable cause cases sup
ported two generalizations, the reasonable suspicion cases admit bu
one: "Given the degree that this determination is dependent upon th,
peculiar facts of the situation presented, the appearance of inconsistency
44. United States v. Tinkle, 655 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Brinegar v. Unite(
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). See generall
Cantrell, Reasonable Cause in Warrantless Arrests: An Analysis of Some Selected Fac
tors, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 267 (1978); Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REv. 31'
(1971); see also Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. United States v. Young, 598 F.2d 296, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1979), quoted in United State
v. Tinkle, 655 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1981). Probable cause usually is foun
easily. See, e.g., United States v. Darland, 659 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v
Bland, 653 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Roberson, 650 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1981
(appeal pending).
47. Cf. United States v. Tinkle, 655 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1981) (arresting officer aided b3
informant's tip); United States v. Rice, 652 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1981) (arresting officer aidec
by positive identification of first suspect and second suspect was in company with first sus
pect and reluctant to identify himself); United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir
1981) (suspect fled from arresting officer); United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381 (5th Cir
1981) (arresting officer aided by eyewitness identification of getaway vehicle and descriptior
of the suspects); United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct
3111 (1981) (arresting officer aided by dog sniffing defendant's luggage).
48. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES ANE
CoNcEPrs § 3.03, at 62 (1980).
49. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Kreimes, 649 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v
Costner, 646. F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Martin, 636 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.), cert
denied sub nom. Young v. United States, 451 U.S. 917 (1981).
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at least to advocates [and surveyors], is somewhat unavoidable.""'
The most important survey development in the reasonable suspicion
area concerns the significance of the drug courier profile52 in justifying a
stop. A review of presurvey cases in which the court examined airport
stops by agents demonstrated that the reasonable suspicion standard was
not automatically satisfied merely when the characteristics of a person
under surveillance satisfied some or all of the profile characteristics." In
United States v. Sanford," the majority suggested in dictum that some
of the profile characteristics can be "considered significant when properly
evaluated" toward a finding of reasonable suspicion." The dissent re-
jected the majority's notion that there were any additional facts in San-
ford to be considered along with the profile, characteristics to support a
finding of reasonable suspicion." Since the issue was not necessary to the
holding in Sanford and the issue likewise was discussed without definitive
resolution in other survey opinions,5 it remains open. The issue may be
something of a straw person. It seems beyond doubt that the profile is a
legitimate tool of law enforcement. Many of the characteristics included
in the profile are, however, consistent with innocence. The court has ex-
pressed a concern that the profiles not be abused to support totally arbi-
trary and random stops." It is almost too obvious that whether law en-
51. United States v. Kreimes, 649 F.2d 1185, 1190 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing cases).
52. The drug courier profile is a list of primary and secondary characteristics that drug
agents use to identify drug couriers in airports. A typical profile follows:
The seven primary characteristics are: (1) arrival from or departure to an
identified source city; (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities of empty
suitcases; (3) unusual itinerary, such as a rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy
airplane trip; (4) use of an alias; (5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency
in the many thousands of dollars, usually on their person, in briefcases or bags; (6)
purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small denomination currency;
and (7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by passengers.
The secondary characteristics are (1) the almost exclusive use of public trans-
portation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the airport; (2) immediately
making a telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving a false or fictitious call-back
telephone number with the airline being utilized; and (4) excessively frequent
travel to source or distribution cities.
United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1980). See also United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978).
53. United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
54. 658 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 346.
56. Id. at 348. (Randall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Berry, 636 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3111 (1981).
58. United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1080 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
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forcement agents include a factor in the profile should be largel
irrelevant to the court's evaluation of reasonable suspicion based on a
the circumstances. The actual facts must control. The only conceivab]
relevance of inclusion on the list of a particular characteristic, which tb
facts of a case demonstrate supported a stop, is the additional weight al
tributable to the training and experience of the officers and the collectiv
expertise of the agency.59 The reasonable suspicion standard is objectiv
Nevertheless, "it is important to recall that a trained law enforcemer
agent may be 'able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduc
which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.'"o One c
more particular characteristics in the actual context may trigger a reasor
able suspicion in a trained agent. That the characteristic is on a list c
things to watch for is of no additional consequence.
The third essential issue that seizures of persons raise is whether th
government actors followed the appropriate procedures. During the stu
vey period, the court considered a few questions in this area, which calle,
for little more than the application of recent Supreme Court precedent.'
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The protection of the fourth amendment comes into play if, and only ii
the government, as searcher and seizer, has violated an individual's res
sonable expectation of privacy. Several survey decisions dealt with thes
most basic fourth amendment tenets. The general rule is that the fourt
amendment does not apply to searches made by foreign officials in thei
own country unless either the conduct of the foreign officials "shocks th
conscience" or the search was really an American function due to partici
pation or instigation by American officials."s In United States v. Hau
Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1155 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
60. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (quol
ing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979)), quoted in United States v. Sanford, 65
F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1981).
61. See, e.g., Holifield v. Davis, 662 F.2d 710 (11th Cir. 1981) (defendant's arrest purst
ant to warrant issued under city code provision that was subsequently declared unconstitt
tional was not illegal); United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant ha
no protected expectation of privacy when he answered the door of his home, and his wai
rantless arrest was constitutional); United States v. Congote, 656 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981
(the fourth amendment prohibits the police from entering a suspect's home to make a rot
tine felony arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances); Carnejo-Molina v. Immigratio
& Naturalization Serv., 649 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1981).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Caicedo-Asprilla, 632 F.2d 1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980), ceri
denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981); United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1980
United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 95
(1977); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782-83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 96
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kins,s the court found no reason to depart from the general rule. The
search was carried out pursuant to a Panamanian search warrant in an
acceptable manner. American official involvement was limited to notify-
ing the local officials that a plane suspected of carrying narcotics had
crashed in Panama. The Panamanian officials did not act as agents for, or
under pressure from, the American officials. The mere notification by
American officials was an insufficient level of participation and involve-
ment to render the search American."
When the focus is shifted from the searcher and seizer to the place or
thing searched and seized, the aggrieved party also must demonstrate the
invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy to establish a fourth
amendment violation. The limits of the fourth amendment are two di-
mensional. Either there is no expectation of privacy due to the intrinsic
nature of the thing itself, or the person does not have a sufficiently per-
sonal nexus with the thing. These two concepts sometimes are referred to
as the public exposure doctrine and the requirement of standing. 5 They
represent closely related concepts used to demarcate the constitutionally
cognizable privacy interest.66
The analysis under the public exposure doctrine distinguishes between
the protected and the unprotected on the basis of the individual's out-
ward manifestations. The Supreme Court made the distinction in the
landmark decision Katz v. United States:e7 "What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. . . .But what he seeks to preserve as pri-
vate, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected." ' A person has no justifiable expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of the original checks, deposit slips, and financial statements that
he voluntarily turns over to a third party bank. He cannot entertain a
legitimate expectation that the bank will not disclose the documents to
authorities.6 9 A father who produced documents for government agents
and stated that he wished to aid their investigation had no fourth amend-
(1965).
63. 661 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. The court did not discuss whether the search would have triggered the exclusionary
rule or whether some warrant-excusing condition was present. See Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
65. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTrrUTIONAL CASES AND
CONcEIPrs § 4.02, at 91 (1980).
66. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
67. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
68. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
69. United States v. Williams, 639 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending);
accord, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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ment claim, even though agents were interviewing his daugher in hi
home."0 Neither the captain nor the crew could claim a legitimate expec
tation of privacy in an area subject to the common access of those legiti
mately aboard the vessel.7' Finally, Katz has been applied to the use c
trained dogs. Whatever privacy interest there is in the contents of lug
gage,72 the use of dogs to sniff the exterior of luggage did not invade
fourth amendment protection,73 even when the agents "prepped" the bag
by squeezing the air out of them.
74
The arcane concept of standing to raise fourth amendment claims, a]
though somewhat dated, focuses on the nexus between the aggrievei
party and the place or thing subjected to search or seizure. Pragmaticall:
there is little, if any, difference between considering the personal interes
of the individual and measuring the reasonableness of an expectation o
privacy in the evidence. The Supreme Court recently said as much.
Nevertheless, the slogan survives.7' A new analytical framework ha
emerged from a spate of recent Supreme Court decisions.7 In order b
contest the validity of a search and seizure, an accused must assert
property or possessory interest in the property searched or at least som,
legitimate expectation of privacy in it. 8 Even an accused charged wit]
criminal possession of the evidence seized may not claim the protection o
the fourth amendment in the absence of a legitimate expectation of pri
vacy. 79 Bystanders, visitors, or absentees from the scene who have ni
ownership or possessory rights in the property searched cannot be heart
70. United States v. Burns, 662 F.2d 1378, 1385 (11th Cir. 1981); accord, Coolidge
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
71. United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Willis, 63'
F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980) (appes
pending); accord, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
72. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
(1977).
73. United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 311
(1981).
74. United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1981).
75. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. &
(1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 654 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1981); United States'%
Pena-Cantu, 639 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765 (5th Cii
1981) (appeal pending); United States v. Molina-Garcia, 634 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1981). Bu
see, e.g., United States v. Glasgow, 658 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Meyei
656 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981).
77. See generally United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); see also generall
Kuhns, The Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment Standing Cases, 6
IOWA L. REV. 493 (1980).
78. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
79. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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to complain. 80
In response to this renaissance of privacy, the Fifth Circuit has frac-
tured the legitimate expectation of privacy talisman into several noncon-
stitutional factors, with no single factor predominating: (1) whether the
defendant has a property interest in the thing seized or the place
searched; (2) whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing
seized or the place searched; (3) whether the defendant has the right to
exclude others from that place; (4) whether the defendant has exhibited a
subjective expectation that it would remain inviolate against government
encroachment; (5) whether the defendant manifested a concern for pri-
vacy by taking expected precautions against invasion; (6) whether the de-
fendant was legitimately present or in possession. 1 The court applied
these factors in several survey decisions. In one decision, defendant was
found to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in gambling records he
secreted in his parents' home under their bed. 82 His parents had ensured
his unencumbered access by giving him a key and permission to use their
home. He kept clothes there and occasionally stayed overnight. He con-
ducted his gambling activities at their home, owned the records, and ex-
hibited an obvious subjective expectation that the hidden records would
remain private. In contrast, a second decision held that although defen-
dants were present as guests of the tenant when the apartment was
searched, they could not challenge the search of a bathroom cabinet in
which drugs were found even though they subjectively intended that their
interrupted drug transaction remain private.88 A third case emphasized
how fact-bound this analysis is. Defendants in this third case were not
permitted to challenge the search of a house even though they had occu-
pied the premises for several weeks,8 a factor the concurring judge felt
controlled the issue. 8 Searches of personalty resulted in similar distinc-
tions. One defendant, charged with a possessory offense, could challenge
the search of a package mailed to him even though he denied ownership
since his claim that he was picking it up for someone else amounted to an
assertion of a lawful possessory claim. 86 In a second case, a defendant
could not claim the protection of the fourth amendment against a search
of a van he did not own even though he drove it on several errands after
80. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980).
81. United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. Id.
83. United States v. Meyer, 656 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. United States v. Molina-Garcia, 634 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1981).
85. Id. at 221-22 (Tate, J., concurring).
86. United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
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the search.87 Finally, any expectation of privacy in personal property wi
be deemed forfeited by its abandonment."'
Although the framers of the fourth amendment apparently were mor
concerned with the elements of a valid warrant than with the criteria fa
lawful warrantless searches and seizures, their priority has been sup
planted to a great extent. Two polar approaches to the warrant require
ment exist.8 9 On the one hand, some commentators interpret the fourt'
amendment to require search warrants in all but a few narrowly definel
situations. Their orientation is to inquire whether it was reasonable fo
the officials to have failed to procure a warrant before conducting th
search and seizure.9 0 On the other hand, other commentators interpre
the fourth amendment warrant clause as merely stating the standards fc
the issuance of a warrant, should the officials seek one. Their orientatio:
is to inquire whether the official conduct in the particular search an,
seizure was reasonable, with or without a warrant, since the protection i
only against unreasonable searches.' 1 If this survey year is any indicatior
the judges of the Fifth Circuit seem to have embraced this latter orients
tion. While decisions concerning the warrant itself are few and of littl
consequence,' the reports are teeming with decisions involving warrani
less searches, including searches incident to a lawful arrest, consen
searches, plain view searches, border searches, exigent searches, and autc
mobile searches. The remainder of this section is devoted to these wa
rant exceptions.
The first significant exception to the warrant requirement is the searc.
incident to a lawful arrest. The rationale of this exception defines it
scope. Contemporaneous with a valid arrest, officials may'search the pel
son and the area within his immediate control for weapons, evidence the
might be subject to destruction, or contraband.93 The full search of th
person permits the search of the contents of a wallet found in the pel
87. United States v. Glasgow, 658 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. United States v. Edwards, 644 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2
979 (5th Cir. 1981). Apparently, the government can abandon the opportunity to make suc
an objection. See United States v. Gaultney, 656 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1981) (on remand).
89. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AN
CONCEPTS § 4.02, at 102-03 (1980).
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. Cal
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
92. See, e.g., United States v. DeSimone, 660 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1981); United States'
Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cady, 651 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1981
(appeal pending); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981); United States,
Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Green, 634 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1981
United States v. Fitzharris, 633 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2325 (1980).




son's trousers pocket 4 or a piece of paper in his shirt pocket."9 The area
under the arrestee's control includes boxes of stolen articles present with
the arrestee in her car." The Fifth Circuit has expanded the searchable
area to allow a quick and cursory security check of the arrestee's lodging,
even though the arrest is effected outside, when the arresting officials
have reasonable grounds to believe that there are others present inside
who pose a security risk."
Consent searches, a second exception to the warrant clause, raise three
basic concerns: (1) whether the consent is valid; (2) whether the search
was within the scope of the consent; and (3) whether the appropriate per-
son gave the consent." Although the consent must be voluntary in light
of all the circumstances, an unawareness of the ability to refuse does not
destroy voluntariness, even if the person is in custody." The Fifth Cir-
cuit has immunized the district court's determination of voluntariness,
except when clearly erroneous, thereby making it a nearly futile appellate
issue. 00 While the scope of the consent given may expressly limit the
search, the permission granted usually will be interpreted broadly to al-
low for an effective search. 0 Finally, a third party may consent. A wife,
for example, who enjoyed joint control of an automobile with her husband
could consent to its search although her husband had previously refused
consent." 2
A third well-worn exception to the warrant requirement is the so-called
94. United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981).
95. United States v. McFarland, 633 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1980).
96. United States v. Roberson, 650 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending). See
New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
97. United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v.
Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 (1980), and United States
v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977)). But see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970);
Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969).
98. See generally Comment, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: The Question of Noncus-
todial and Custodial Consent Searches, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 286 (1975); Com-
ment, Third-Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 121
(1973).
99. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973).
100. Although defendant affirmatively helped the officers in the search, in United States
v. Webb, 633 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1981), the court added an aside that shows just how volun-
tary the consent must be: "He was not intoxicated, was not handcuffed, and was not
threatened with the shotgun." Id. at 1142. See also, e.g., United States v. Williams, 647
F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal
pending); United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dorr, 636
F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1981).
101. United States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Smith,
649 F.2d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 1981).
102. United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981).
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plain view doctrine which, simply stated, permits seizure of objects falling
within the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view.1 0 3 One significant survey development concerned the
search of carry-on luggage in airports. Sequentially, once the security
screening x-ray machine discloses suspicious images, the luggage may be
inspected for weapons or dangerous objects. Once opened, the contents
are in plain view and any contraband is subject to a warrantless
seizure.10
4
Border searches, sometimes sanctioned as an exception to the warrant
requirement, are more correctly justified on the theory that a person
crossing an international boundary has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.'0 5 The most important border search decision during the survey pe-
riod was United States v. Sandler,106 in which the en banc court consid-
ered the appropriateness of a personal pat-down search as part of a
routine border inspection. Prior decisions had established that a routine
search of luggage at the border requires no justification.10 7 In Sandler, the
majority sought to measure the intrusiveness of personal searches in or-
der to determine the level of justification required. The court distin-
guished between pat-down searches of a person and the more intrusive
strip searches or body cavity searches that must rest on a reasonable sus-
picion even at the border. The court defined the routine pat-down to
include a frisk, the removal of outer garments such as coats, hats, or
shoes, and the emptying of pockets, wallets, or purses. The court then
went on to hold that no justification was required for these pat-downs
other than the person's decision to cross the national boundary.'0 8
103. See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 650 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pend-
ing); United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dorr, 636
F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Green, 634 F.2d 222, 225 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981).
See generally Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search
Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 (1975).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 917
(1981); United States v. Wehrli, 637 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3089 (1981);
United States v. Gorman, 637 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981).
105. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The same considerations apply at inland locations deemed the
functional equivalent of the border. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652
F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ramos, 645 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending). See generally Note, Bor-
der Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968).
106. 644 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). See also, e.g., United States v. MacPher-
son, 664 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Ramos, 645 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
107. See United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
902 (1977).
108. 644 F.2d at 1169. See also United States v. Ramos, 645 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Sometimes warrantless police searches and seizures are justified simply
because "the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.""'
Whereas all the warrant exceptions, except consent searches, are based to
some extent on exigency, in this category of warrantless searches the
emergency is pronounced. In these situations, the court must measure
the intensity of the exigency and the permissible scope of the search. The
hot pursuit of apparent drug smugglers, the immediate need to discover
fleeing coconspirators, and the danger posed by the possible presence of
an armed fugitive at large late at night in a rural area, coalesced in suffi-
cient exigency to justify the opening of a zippered suitcase found in the
defendant's truck and a cursory search for some identification."' Al-
though acknowledging that it was a "close call," the court deemed the
warrantless search reasonable as an effort to block the flight of armed
fugitives who were a serious danger to the public."' In a second exigency
search case, the court approved the seizure of marijuana from an off-load-
ing vessel and land transports which were searched during the excitement
and confusion of a drug raid because of the danger that one of the sus-
pects would flee in the vehicles or that the vehicles may have hidden co-
conspirators who presented a danger to the police."' In a third case, the
exigent search exception overcame the recent Supreme Court rulings
which require that the police obtain a search warrant before opening any
closed opaque container whose exterior or shape does not disclose its
probable contents.' The court also upheld the warrantless exigent
search of a briefcase found in the trunk of a vehicle when the search was
based on the suspicion that the briefcase contained a loaded spring-trig-
gered pistol.1 " By contrast, the contents of a brown paper bag found
next to the briefcase were suppressed for lack of any indication of an
exigency creating danger.'"
The final warrant clause exception to be considered is the so-called au-
tomobile exception. The term is something of a misnomer since the cate-
gory is neither limited to automobiles nor does it cover all automobile
109. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (quoting McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). See generally Gilligan, Continuing Evisceration of [the] Fourth
Amendment, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1977); see also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.
38 (1976).
110. United States v. Kreimes, 649 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1981).
111. Id. at 1190-93.
112. United States v. Mesa, 660 F.2d 1070, 1078 (5th Cir. 1981).
113. United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending); see gen-
erally Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
114. 646 F.2d at 959. See also United States v. Rivera, 654 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1981).
115. 646 F.2d at 959-62.
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searches." 6 An automobile may be searched without a warrant when
there are exigent circumstances and probable cause to believe that it con-
tains articles subject to seizure.'1 7 The automobile exception is not lim-
ited to situations in which the vehicle is seized after police stop it on a
highway. Rather, exigency can be derived from the unrestricted public
access to a parked, locked automobile in the immediate area of a bank
robbery when the fleeing bank robber has not been apprehended and po-
lice have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence
necessary to his capture."" An initial exigency of this type may allow a
search even after impoundment as long as there is the slightest chance
that the vehicle or its contents may be moved before a valid search war-
rant can be obtained." 9
The electronic age has affected this facet of fourth amendment law.
The issue of installing a beeper on a vehicle without a warrant has di-
vided the courts of appeals. The First Circuit has held that no warrant is
required for the attachment and monitoring of beepers but that probable
cause must exist to justify the intrusion. 2 The Sixth Circuit requires a
warrant and probable cause for the installation of a beeper.' Other cir-
cuits have avoided deciding the issue because judicial authorization, con-
sent, or exigent circumstances justified the installation.2 M The Fifth Cir-
cuit considered the issue en banc a few terms ago but divided evenly
without conclusion.2 2 During the survey period, the Fifth Circuit. finally
did resolve the issue in United States v. Michael. 24 Recognizing that the
fourth amendment protects individuals from violations of their reasona-
ble expectation of privacy, the court initially opined that this expectation
is diminished with respect to automobiles. Nonetheless, whatever reason-
116. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1981) (vessel); United
States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1981) (containers in automobile).
117. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970). See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What
It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976).
118. United States v. McBee, 659 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1981).
119. Id. at 1306. See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n.7 (1977); United
States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
120. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978).
121. United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 603 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1018 (1980); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
847 (1979).
123. United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
124. 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The new rule for the Fifth Circuit seems
secure for a time. Although three justices dissented, the Supreme Court declined to recon-




able expectation of privacy of movement remained, that expectation was
compromised by the installation of a beeper in defendant's vehicle while
the vehicle was parked in a public place and when the vehicle was tracked
on public roads during the daytime. The court balanced this dimunition
of privacy against the governmental interest in eliminating criminal con-
duct through effective surveillance. Since the privacy interest was slight
and the governmental interest was significant, the court concluded that
reasonable suspicion entitled government agents to install a beeper in a
private automobile without a warrant."2 8
IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION
During the survey period, pretrial applications of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination involved issues of voluntariness as
well as certain nuances of the Miranda2 doctrine. While an inquiry into
the voluntariness of the confession itself theoretically is a separate and
distinct issue from the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, both are deter-
mined under a "totality of the circumstances" approach and, as a conse-
quence, the theoretical distinction has become factually blurred. 27
The ultimate issue of voluntariness is an issue of law which requires
that the appellate court make an independent assessment of the totality
of the circumstances. ' 8 Thus viewed, the court "must conclude that [the
defendant] made an independent and informed choice of his own free
will, possessing the capability to do so, his will not being overborne by the
pressures and circumstances swirling around him.'' s2 The burden of dem-
onstrating constitutional voluntariness is on the government. 30 The focus
is on the impact of the circumstances on the defendant; the truth or fal-
sity of the confession itself is not part of the "totality of the circum-
stances. '"' In the typical situation the government demonstrates volun-
125. At the border, neither warrant nor suspicion is necessary. See United States v.
Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981). When installed pursuant to a warrant, the warrant
will be scrutinized for reasonableness of the authority actually exercised. See United States
v. Cady, 651 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
127. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 409 (5th
Cir. 1981).
128. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Davis v. North Carolina, 384
U.S. 737 (1966).
129. Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 937 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981).
130. See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
131. United States v. Kreczmer, 636 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Lego v. Twomey,
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tariness with a signed waiver form which, "though not conclusive, is
'usually strong proof of the voluntariness of the waiver.""'13 Issues con-
cerning free will and rational intellect are more troublesome. 3 A confes-
sion is involuntary if obtained when "the defendant is so intoxicated by
alcohol or other drugs that the confession is not rationally and freely
given."' 3 " Educational and mental shortcomings also are relevant factors
in the voluntariness analysis.'3 5 The fundamental concern is that a weak
will or mind is vulnerable to overreaching.3 6 Henry v. Dees' involved
such a mental deficiency. Defendant was a twenty-year-old marginally re-
tarded man charged with armed robbery. His intelligence quotient was
between sixty-five and sixty-nine; he had completed the sixth grade, but
he read on a second grade level. Defense counsel and the prosecutor
agreed that defendant would take a polygraph test. If he passed, the pros-
ecutor would nolle prosequi the case; if he failed, defendant would plead
guilty. During the examination and without the presence of counsel, the
polygraph examiner misrepresented to the defendant that he had failed
and defendant subsequently made an inculpatory statement that was in-
troduced at his trial. Expressing some doubt whether defendant had the
capacity to waive his rights," 8 the court held that the subterfuge had ne-
gated any semblance of voluntariness. Signed waivers were not enough. In
these situations, the court concluded, extra precautions were necessary to
assure voluntariness and in this case none were taken.
In Miranda v. Arizona,'3 the Supreme Court held inadmissible all
"statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custo-
dial interrogation of the defendant unless [the prosecution] demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination."'04 The most important aspect of the decision, the fa-
404 U.S. 477, 484 n.12 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 383-86 (1964); Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 n.9 (1960).
132. United States v. Satterfield, 644 F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
133. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
134. United States v. Kreczmer, 636 F.2d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States
v. Taylor, 508 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1975)).
135. See, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707
(1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
136. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
137. 658 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1981).
138. Id. at 409 & n.6 (citing Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972)).
139. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
140. Id. at 444. The accused must be informed as follows:
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
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mous litany of warnings, played no significant part in the survey deci-
sions."" Rather, the Miranda doctrine cases during the survey period
concerned the questions of when a suspect is in custody and what consti-
tutes an interrogation.
While a traditional arrest with all the trappings of police apprehension
and transportation to the station house for processing satisfies the cus-
tody requirement, 4 2 something less will suffice to mandate the Miranda
warnings. Once probable cause to arrest exists, the Fifth Circuit considers
three factors in deciding whether an interrogation occurred in a custodial
setting: (1) whether the subjective intent of the officer doing the interro-
gating was to hold the defendant; (2) whether the defendant's subjective
belief was that his freedom was significantly restricted; and (3) whether
the investigation had focused on the defendant at the time of the interro-
gation. 43 When postal officials removed a suspect from her car, escorted
the suspect into her office, and detained her, the custody requirement was
satisfied without formal words of arrest or the filing of a formal arrest
record.' Under the three-pronged test, other situations are just as obvi-
ously not custodial. A police-citizen encounter at an airport is not a custo-
dial interrogation even when the citizen declines cooperation and the
agent persists. 145  Warnings need not be given during such noncustodial
interrogations as "on the scene questioning as to the facts surrounding
the crime and other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process.'14' The Coast Guard's routine stop, boarding, and inspection of
an American vessel on the high seas does not create a custodial setting.4"
Even though an accused is in custody, he will not be entitled to the
questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
141. It should be noted that the erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation
of the Miranda rules does not automatically require reversal. Such violations are subject to
the constitutional harmless error rule. See generally Germany v. Estelle, 639 F.2d 1301,
1303 (5th Cir. 1981).
142. United States v. Darland, 659 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1981).
143. See United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 92 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Nash, 563 F.2d 1166, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1977).
144. United States v. Roberson, 650 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending); see
also United States v. Darland, 659 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1981).
145. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally text ac-
companying notes 52-60 supra.
146. United States v. Rice, 652 F.2d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966)).
147. United States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296, 1301 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v.
Jonas, 639 F.2d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1070
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980)).
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Miranda warnings if neither an interrogation nor its functional
equivalent occurs. At the extremes, the interrogation issue is easily re-
solved. Actual questioning and interrogation require a warning; 48 in the
total absence of any inquisitory activity the warning requirement is not
triggered. 149 In between these two extremes, any interaction that is the
functional equivalent of an interrogation must be accompanied by a
warning. Interrogation is functionally defined as "any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." 150 Funtional interrogation con-
tinued even after an interview in defendant's cell had formally ceased, for
example, when the agent stated, "'You sure messed up by stealing a
truck and bringing it from Alabama to Florida,'" which evoked the re-
sponse, "'Well, I needed transportation.' "51 A police officer's statement
that defendant had failed a polygraph test and the officer's challenge to
defendant to "tell the truth about this thing" was a functional interroga-
tion. '1 Finally, volunteered and spontaneous statements made before"'3
or after 5 4 actual interrogation do not satisfy the interrogation criterion.1 55
One last decision that dealt with a Miranda issue was Battie v. Es-
telle.'56 The court withheld decision of Battie pending the decision of the
Supreme Court in EsteUe v. Smith.1 5 7 In Smith, the Supreme Court held
that the considerations compelling a warning prior to custodial interroga-
tion apply equally to court-ordered psychiatric inquiries into competency
for trial that the prosecution uses at the penalty stage of a capital trial.
After carefully evaluating the Supreme Court's holding and the applica-
ble constitutional principles, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Smith
should be applied retroactively.158  Absent the Miranda warning and
waiver, the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist relating his con-
versation with defendant was inadmissible.
148. United States v. Darland, 659 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1981).
149. United States v. Satterfield, 644 F.2d 1092, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1981).
150. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted); see also Har-
ryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980).
151. United States v. Little, 647 F.2d 533, 533 (5th Cir. 1980).
152. Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1981).
153. United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1981).
154. United States v. Webb, 633 F.2d 1140, 1142 (5th Cir. 1981).
155. See generally Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis, 44E
U.S. 291 (1980).
156. 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 683 n.11
(5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
157. 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
158. See generally Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965). See also generally Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought": A Cali
for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 417 (1969)
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The most significant remaining group of fifth amendment survey deci-
sions concerns the perennial problem of trial comments about the failure
of a criminal defendant to testify in his own defense.159 To reverse for
improper comment, the Fifth Circuit must conclude either that the
speaker's manifest intention was to comment on the accused's failure to
testify or that the character of the remark was such that the jury natu-
rally and necessarily would consider it as such. 60 Thus, both direct and
indirect comments that undermine the privilege are the basis for rever-
sal. s ' Since the privilege is personal, the court has distinguished care-
fully between comments concerning the failure of the defense to come
forward with an explanation of the evidence, which are permissible, and
comments concerning the defendant's own silence in the face of damning
evidence, which are not permissible. 6 2 Furthermore, improper comments
by persons other than the prosecutor, such as statements by a codefend-
ant or a codefendant's attorney, also can undermine the privilege."es
While occasionally the court applies these standards summarily and
does not mention the allegedly offending comment," 4 the directness of
the comment in context is controlling. Some survey examples, illustrate
this point. An exhortation to the jury by codefendant's attorney that
"things are not always as they seem" was a legitimate request that the
jury look beyond the apparent.65 When, in closing argument, defense
counsel referred to defendant's life being in jeopardy of ruin, it was per-
missible for the prosecutor to rebut by arguing that defendant had
charted his own fate and was blameworthy on the uncontroverted facts.' 66
159. See, e.g., United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendants waived
fifth amendment claim by failing to assert it in a timely fashion); United States v. Haydel,
649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981) (search and seizure of gambling records was not compulsory
self-incrimination); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 646 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1981) (privilege
against self-incrimination reaches compelled production of individual's private books and
papers in response to grand jury subpoena); United States v. Ylda, 643 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.
1981) (prosecutor's comment on accused's postarrest silence was harmless error); United
States v. Meeks, 642 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending) (conviction of civil contempt
could not be grounded upon an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by a
defendant when the defendant was asked why he could not produce subpoenaed corporate
records).
160. United States v. Magana-Arevalo, 639 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 825 (5th Cir. 1980).
161. United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Forrest,
620 F.2d 446, 455 (5th Cir. 1980).
162. United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bright,
630 F.2d 804, 825 (5th Cir. 1980).
163. United States v. Aguiar, 610 F.2d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
827 (1981).
164. E.g., United States v. Magana-Arvello, 639 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1981).
165. United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1981).
166. United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 1981).
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A prosecutor's comment that, "if he wants to take the stand he may" was
not a reversible error reference to defendant's election not to testify,
when in context the prosecutor seemed to be referring to defense coun-
sel. l 7 A prosecutor's argument that agents' live testimony should be given
more weight than their written report could not be construed as an indi-
rect comment on the accused's silence. 168 When a defendant voluntarily
takes the stand to testify in his own defense, he waives the privilege to an
extent. On proper cross-examination the prosecutor may ask questions to
which the defendant invokes the fifth amendment and this will not be
reversible error. 6 9
V. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In civil proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata prevents parties from
relitigating claims and factual issues previously determined in a final
judgment on the merits. This doctrine protects two societal val-
ues: prospective litigants are protected from the expense and harass-
ment of unwanted participation in litigation, and scarce judicial resources
are conserved. 170 Double jeopardy, the criminal counterpart to res judi-
cata, emphasizes the first goal. Although modern double jeopardy princi-
ples have their origin in abstract and ancient concepts of law,' 7 ' the basic
policy underlying the constitutional guarantee has remained constant.
Once an individual has been exposed to the substantial danger and risk of
criminal punishment, he should not, without his consent, be exposed a
second time to the same danger for the same offense.7 " The courts have
not formulated an all-encompassing theory to implement the fifth amend-
ment policy. Rather, double jeopardy case law has developed several
rules, each being applied to a different factual situation, each engendering
disparate policy considerations, and each yielding to a myriad of excep-
tions. Survey decisions may be grouped into three categories of is-
sues: (1) determining when jeopardy attaches; (2) applying exceptions to
the bar against multiple prosecutions; and (3) deciding when the same
offense is involved in a subsequent proceeding.
In determining if a person is "twice in jeopardy," the initial question is
167. United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 390 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending). But
see United States v. DeSimone, 660 F.2d 532, 543 (5th Cir. 1981).
168. United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981).
169. United States v. Hernandez, 646 F.2d 970, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
170. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at'50-53 (1970).
171. See generally M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969); L. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOP-
ARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1968); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969).
172. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See generally Westen &
Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 81.
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whether a prior exposure was a first jeopardy. A former jeopardy becomes
fixed, if at all, when a jury is empanelled and sworn or, in bench trials,
when the first witness is sworn. 73 Obviously, jeopardy has attached by
the time a defendant begins serving his sentence. "" Whether evidence
touching the particular charges actually is introduced at trial is of no rele-
vance to the attachment issue.7 6 When charges against a defendant are
dismissed before a jury is empanelled, no jeopardy attaches to be antece-
dent to a subsequent indictment. 7 6 If an accused pleads guilty, jeopardy
attaches when the plea is taken, apparently because the accused is
deemed the first witness. 7
In recent years, the Supreme Court has expanded the focus of the
double jeopardy provision beyond the individual's protection from a sec-
ond run through the gauntlet178 to include the public's interest. The basic
duality is expressed in two lines of cases. The first line considers when
trial error insulates a defendant from reprosecution and the second line
considers retrials after mistrials. 79
As a general rule, the government is not barred from reprosecuting a
defendant who has won an appellate reversal, either because he waives a
later double jeopardy claim or because the original jeopardy is somehow
continued.' 80 The double jeopardy clause does, however, preclude "a sec-
ond trial once a reviewing court has determined that the evidence intro-
duced at trial was insufficient to sustain the verdict."'' One Fifth Circuit
consequence of this exception is that on appeal the court will evaluate a
claim of inadequate evidence despite a reversal on other grounds in order
to prejudge a former jeopardy claim upon retrial. s Still left unresolved
173. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (state jury trial); Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377 (1975) (bench trial); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (federal jury
trial).
174. Williams v. Wainwright, 650 F.2d 58, 61 (5th Cir. 1981).
175. United States v. Fine, 644 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
669 (1981).
176. United States v. Futch, 637 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1981).
177. United States v. Broussard, 645 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981). This plea, when made
knowingly and voluntarily, waives only nonjurisdictional defects and not a claim of former
jeopardy. Id. at 505.
178. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 189 (1957).
179. Compare Hudson v. Louisana, 101 S. Ct. 970 (1981); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19
(1978); and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) with Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497 (1978); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977); and United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600 (1976).
180. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957). But see United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
181. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978). See also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1 (1978).
182. United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1340-44 (5th Cir. 1981).
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is whether a second trial is prohibited when the legally competent evi-
dence, as distinguished from all the evidence admitted, is insufficient to
sustain a conviction. 8 This exception raises procedural issues as well as
constitutional issues. While appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain
interlocutory appeals from collateral pretrial orders denying dismissal on
double jeopardy grounds, the substance of the motion determines juris-
diction. 84 It is not enough to justify an interlocutory appeal by a simple
claim that the evidence is insufficient and that the denial of the motion to
acquit is wrong. Instead, the appellate court must be asked to decide
whether a prior determination of insufficiency bars retrial either in the
form of a jury finding of not guilty, a trial judge's grant of an acquittal
motion, or an earlier appellate court reversal on insufficiency grounds." 5
The basic duality of double jeopardy is demonstrated vividly in the cir-
cumstance of a mistrial. The Supreme Court has held that the plea in bar
does not apply when "the defendant's interest in proceeding to verdict is
outweighed by the competing and equally legitimate demand for public
justice." 8 6
When the trial judge sua sponte declares a mistrial, the decision is so
discretionary that it will not bar a reprosecution unless the trial judge
failed to consider carefully the alternatives and acted in an abrupt, er-
ratic, or precipitate manner.187 Thus, a mistrial hastily entered because a
juror forgot to bring his high blood pressure pills from home barred fur-
ther prosecution.1 88 On the other hand, a mistrial based on the death of a
juror's mother and entered after the judge deliberated was an exercise of
the judge's sound discretion and did not bar reprosecution.1 89
When the defense makes the motion for mistrial, the double jeopardy
clause will bar reprosecution only in narrow circumstances. Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit precedent establish the criteria. A mistrial en-
tered merely to avoid the consequences of judicial or prosecutorial error
183. Tapp v. Lucas, 658 F.2d 383, 385 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
184. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); United States v. Becton, 632 F.2d
1294 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 141 (1981).
185. United States v. Rey, 641 F.2d 222, 224-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 318
(1981).
186. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). See generally Comment, Retrial
After Mistrial: The Double Jeopardy Doctrine of Manifest Necessity, 45 Miss. L.J. 1272
(1974).
187. Grandberry v. Bonner, 653 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1981); Cherry v. Director of
Stte Bd. of Crrections, 635 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also Arizona v. Washing-
ton, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); United States v. Star-
ling, 571 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1978).
188. Grandberry v. Bonner, 653 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1980).
189. Cherry v. Director of State Bd. of Corrections, 635 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
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does not bar reprosecution in and of itself.' 90 The misconduct of the judge
or prosecutor must be in bad faith,' intentional or grossly negligent, 9 2
and seriously prejudicial to the defendant. 1" Three survey period deci-
sions called for application of these criteria. A prosecutor's failure to dis-
close a witness' new address to the defense, even after the trial judge di-
rected him to do so, did not demonstrate sufficient bad faith or prejudice
to the defense to bar reprosecution."' 4 A prosecutor's intransigent misin-
terpretation of precedent did not "descend to the [requisite] level of in-
tentional misconduct, gross negligence, or prosecutorial overreaching." 5
A mistrial granted on a defense motion did not bar reprosecution when
an allegedly duplicitous count was included in an indictment. The indict-
ment had been designed to meet defense objections to an earlier indict-
ment and had survived pretrial defense challenges even though the du-
plicity was discovered only after trial.'"
Because the double jeopardy clause only proscribes multiple punish-
ments for the "same offense," a critical inquiry is whether two prosecu-
tions involve distinct and independent offenses. The so-called same evi-
dence test may be simply stated: if there is any factual difference
between the elements to be proven under two provisions, the two in-
stances are not the same offense." 7 Two separate substantive offenses
also will satisfy this test.1" Additionally, a conspiracy charge is not the
190. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971). The Supreme Court soon will add
to this area of double jeopardy jurisprudence. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. 415, 619
P.2d 948 (1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981).
191. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); United States v. Wright, 622 F.2d
792, 795 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980).
192. United States v. Luttrell, 609 F.2d 1190, 1191 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1256 (5th Cir. 1976).
193. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608-11 (1976); United States v. Opager, 616
F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1980).
194. Baker v. Metcalfe, 633 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1980).
195. United States v. Fine, 644 F.2d 1018, 1023 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 669
(1981).
196. United States v. Westoff, 653 F.2d 1047, 1049-52 (5th Cir. 1981).
197. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977);
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The
rival "same transaction" test has never commanded a majority in the Surpeme Court or in
the Fifth Circuit. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Miller v. Turner, 658 F.2d 348
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Davis, 656 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1981). The Blockburger rule
does not control in the presence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent; Congress
may choose not to punish cumulatively even though to do so would be constitutional. See
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684
(1980).
198. United States v. Colmenares-Hernandez, 659 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1981) (importation
of cocaine separate from possession of cocaine with intent to distribute).
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same offense as an attempt,'99 and a conspiracy is a separate offense from
the underlying substantive offense. '00 Two alleged conspiracies may be ei-
ther separate offenses or the same offense. The Fifth Circuit has identi-
fied five factors to determine whether a unified conspiracy exists: (1)
time; (2) the existence of coconspirators; (3) the statutory offenses
charged in the indictments; (4) the overt acts charged by the government
and any other description of the offense that indicates the nature and
scope of the illicit activity; and (5) the locations where the events took
place.'01
The collateral estoppel doctrine is a final dimension of the double jeop-
ardy provision. The doctrine applies when an issue of fact, ultimate or
merely evidentiary, has been determined by a valid and final judgment. 0 2
Collateral estoppel may operate to bar completely a subsequent prosecu-
tion or to bar introduction or argument of certain facts necessarily estab-
lished in the prior proceedings.2 03 The doctrine has no currency within a
single proceeding.20 4 An attempt to pass a counterfeit bill, for example,
was not the same offense as a completed pass of a different bill that had
been charged in a prior indictment. Nevertheless, collateral estoppel
barred prosecution of the attempt charge because the prior prosecution
had established that defendant had no knowledge that any bill passed to
the same recipient on the same night was counterfeit.20 5 In another case,
defendant was acquitted of charges stemming from the use of a telephone
to facilitate the possession of heroin with intent to distribute. He was
acquitted because the conversation concerned only sham heroin. The ac-
quittal did not, however, bar a later charge of telephone facilitation unre-
lated to the first and concerning real heroin. 20 6
199. United States v. Anderson, 651 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (conspiracy to import con-
trolled substance separate from attempt to import controlled substance).
200. United States v. Counter, 661 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1981) (substantive crime of using a
communication facility to commit a federal drug offense is separate from conspiracy to do
the same); United States v. Pearson, 655 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1981) (importing heroin separate
from conspiracy to do the same); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981)
(appeal pending) (violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act sepa-
rate from conspiracy to do the same); United States v. Broussard, 645 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.
1981) (possessing marijuana separate from conspiracy to do the same).
201. United States v. Henry, 661 F.2d 894, 896 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v.
Futch, 637 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1981)); United States v. Tammaro, 636 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.
1981).
202. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381 (5th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Lee, 622 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1987
(1981); United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1979).
203. United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1979).
204. United States v. Caucci, 635 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1981).
205. United States v. Griggs, 651 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. United States v. Rey, 641 F.2d 222 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 318 (1981).
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VI. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In a leading case, the Fifth Circuit observed that, "the right to counsel
is a vital component in the scheme of due process and the keystone of our
adversary system of criminal justice. 2 0 7  The centrality of the right to
counsel is a result of judicial interpretation rather than textual emphasis.
Judicial interpretation has created three variations on the right to counsel
theme. They are entitlement, surrender, and sufficiency.
The modern status of the entitlement to counsel at trial is well-defined.
As it has evolved, the right to counsel is engaged by any length of actual
imprisonment. No indigent person may be sentenced to a term of impris-
onment unless the government has afforded the defendant with an oppor-
tunity to be assisted at trial by appointed counsel.208 This guarantee has
significant rippling effects beyond the primary flawed conviction. A prior
conviction that is unconstitutional because defendant had no counsel may
not later be "used against a person either to support guilt or enhance
punishment for another offense" and to do so would be "inherently preju-
dicial." ' 9 The Fifth Circuit had held that a prior conviction entered with-
out counsel for which no imprisonment was imposed may be introduced
at the punishment phase of a trial.1 0 During the survey year, the court
concluded that the admission at the punishment phase of a trial of a prior
counselless conviction for which a three day imprisonment was imposed
was harmless constitutional error.' Generally, when the guilt or inno-
cence of a defendant rests on his credibility, the use of a constitutionally
void prior conviction for impeachment is forbidden.2 1 2 Within this cate-
gory, the Fifth Circuit has permitted the introduction at a subsequent
trial of a prior conviction then pending on appeal, subject to explanation
by counsel that the prior conviction may be set aside.1 '2 This survey year
the court held that, in a state trial in which defendant's credibility deter-
mined guilt or innocence, the introduction of a prior conviction was re-
versible error even though the prior conviction was pending on appeal
when introduced and only subsequently was overturned in part on the
207. Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978).
208. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Arges-
inger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See generally Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois
and the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CraM. L. REv. 71
(1979).
209. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
210. Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
211. Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
212. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 560 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1073 (1978); United States v. Franicevich, 471 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ground that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.""
It should be noted that the sixth amendment entitlement goes beyond
the courtroom and counsel. 1 A defendant is entitled to counsel upon ini-
tiation of. adversary proceedings 2 16 As a practical matter, this occurs
"when 'the government ha[d] committed itself to prosecute'" and the in-
dividual finds "himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized
society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law. 217 According to the Fifth Circuit, this immersion does not
occur when a show-up identification is made during the investigation on
the night of the crime prior to any government commitment to prose-
cute." ' Although the sixth amendment sometimes requires defense sup-
port beyond the appointment of counsel, when there was no evidence that
the physician appointed to conduct a psychiatric examination was un-
qualified and the physician's report stated that defendant was not insane,
the failure to appoint a qualified psychiatrist did not offend the
constitution.2 1 '
The surrender of the right to counsel and its concomitant benefits in
favor of exercising the right to self representation is a relatively recent
variation of the sixth amendment theme.2 20 In this situation, it is incum-
bent on a trial judge to conduct a waiver hearing. A defendant "should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.' "221 The waiver hearing should be con-
ducted outside the presence of the jury to avoid prejudice.222 Once prop-
214. Spiegel v. Sandstrom, 637 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1981).
215. The sixth amendment right applies to the states via the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally Fitzgerald
v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975). Beyond
entitlement analysis, the right to be represented by a retained attorney applies not only to
those situations in which an appointed attorney is mandated but also may extend to other
stages. See also Manees v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 470 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring).
216. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
217. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 228 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689 (1972)).
218. Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1981). The court also held,
inter alia, that there was no entitlement to counsel when the government presented photo-
graphs to eyewitnesses for identification. Id. at 566 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220,
227 n.3 (1978) and United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)).
219. Bradbury v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1981).
220. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Rosenberg, Self-Represen-
tation and the Criminally Accused-Evolution and Scope In the Federal Courts, 13 CAL.
W.L. REV. 46 (1976).
221. 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)). See also Scott v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 99, 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885
(1980); Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 1977).
222. United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1981).
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erly surrendered, legal representation cannot be foisted on the accused by
the trial court.223 One who surrenders the right to counsel is exercising
the right to self representation and acquires no rights other than those
also possessed by a represented defendant 22 " For example, absent some
showing of excusable neglect, a pro se defendant's untimely notice of ap-
peal results in dismissal. 2
5
The third theme of the sixth amendment-sufficiency-encompasses a
three-step process. The three stages of the process are allocating the bur-
den of persuasion, establishing the standard of adequacy, and applying
the burden and standard to particular circumstances.
The burden of proving the ineffectiveness of counsel lies with the con-
victed defendant.226 The Fifth Circuit normally will decline to review a
claim of ineffective counsel on direct review when an evidentiary hearing
is necessary, unless the contentions made involve only matters of re-
cord. 22 7 The court has rejected the so-called farce or mockery standard.22 8
Instead, the court considers the actual performance of defense counsel,
whether that counsel is appointed or retained.22 The standard may be
briefly stated as follows:
The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to counsel reasona-
bly likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Effec-
tive assistance is not tantamount to errorless assistance or counsel judged
ineffective by hindsight. The methodology for applying the standard in-
volves an inquiry into the actual performance of counsel and a determi-
223. Lyles v. Estelle, 658 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981).
224. Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Pinkey, 548
F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977)). A pro se litigant's properly filed pleadings, however, are
construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
225. Birl v. United States, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981).
226. Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 388, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1981); Dozier v. United States Dist.
Court, 656 F.2d 990, 992 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3014 (1981).
227. United States v. Curry, 663 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v.
Fuentes-Lozano, 600 F.2d 552, 553 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) and United States v. Coronado, 554
F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977)).
228. Beavers v. Balkcom, 636 F.2d 114, 115-16 (5th Cir. 1981); Herring v. Estelle, 491
F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
229. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 n.9 (1980); United States v. Hughes, 635 F.2d
449, 451 (5th Cir. 1981); Kemp v. Leggett, 635 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1981); Perez v. Wain-
wright, 627 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1980) (mem.). The Fifth Circuit for a long time has consid-
ered the performance of retained and appointed counsel against the same standard. The
court has maintained another distinction, however. A challenge to counsel's performance
can be based on either due process concerns of fundamental fairness or incorporated con-
cerns of effective assistance of counsel. See Ogle v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1981);
Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011
(1975).
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nation based on the totality of the circumstances. 230
On appeal, the court makes fine distinctions between district court find-
ings of primary facts, such as what counsel did to prepare, and findings
that combine legal and factual issues, such as whether counsel's prepara-
tion was so minimal as to be ineffective. The former category is reviewed
under the traditional clearly erroneous standard; the latter category calls
for an independent appellate evaluation. " '
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be founded upon a
fundamentally flawed preparation or performance by defense counsel.
Such fundamental flaws include the following: The failure to interview
or call a witness who would establish an alibi defense;232 the failure to
interview eye witnesses;- 3 inadequate preparatory consulation with de-
fendant;23 4 the failure to conduct any pretrial investigation, including
neglecting to read the transcript of the preliminary hearing;235 the failure
to pursue a possible incompetency defense; 36 the failure to proffer a writ-
ten charge on a lesser included offense; 3 7 the failure to probe venire
members' relevant racial attitudes during voir dire;235 the failure to make
an opening statement;2 3 9 inadequate cross-examination; 240 errors in asser-
tions made during closing argument;24' particular lines of questions asked
or not asked;2 42 the failure to make appropriate and timely objections; 241
and the failure to move for a new trial based on newly discovered
230. Baldwin v. Blackburn, 653 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1981). See also, e.g., Baty v,
Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Burroughs, 650 F.2d 5951
598 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 906-07 (5th Cir. 1981).
231. This rule emerged from the court's careful chronicling of case law in Washington v.
Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1351-54 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391.
394-95 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981).
232. See, e.g., Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d
388 (5th Cir. 1981); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v,
Hughes, 635 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1981).
233. See, e.g., Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Kemp v. Leggett, 635 F.2d
453 (5th Cir. 1981).
234. See, e.g., Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Washington v. Watkins
655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981).
235. See, e.g., Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981).
236. See, e.g., Beavers v. Balkcom, 636 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1981).
237. See, e.g., Kemp v. Leggett, 635 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981).
238. See, e.g., Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 663 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1981).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 635 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1981).
243. See, e.g., Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Estelle, 64"
F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981).
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evidence. "
Some state intrusions into the attorney-client relationship may render
the assistance of counsel ineffective.2 4 Even when the government's ac-
tion directly intrudes on the attorney-client relationship, as when the
government relies on a codefendant turned informant, some remedy short
of dismissal may be appropriate to vindicate the sixth amendment inter-
est and to protect the public interest in seeing the guilty brought to jus-
tice.2 " 6 A defendant is not deprived of a constitutional right, for example,
when a private attorney is retained and paid by the family and friends of
the victim to prosecute the case.2" Still, in such a prosecution, the po-
tential for prejudice is increased and merits a closer examination. The
prosecution did violate the Constitution by making a material eyewitness
unavailable to testify after the witness had been subpoenaed to testify at
defendant's first trial.2 8 From the bench, the participation of two judges
who had not heard oral argument of defense counsel on the final state
appeal did not so intrude on counsel's effectiveness as to violate the Con-
stitution.2 4 9  A trial judge's order to defendant not to discuss the case
with defense counsel during the break between his direct and cross-exam-
ination did, however, deny effective assistance. 8 0
The effectiveness of counsel often is the subject of a challenge to a
guilty plea.2 5 1 When a defendant pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel,
the attorney's obligation is to advise him of the available options and pos-
sible consequences based on the attorney's meaningful investigation of
the facts and the law. 2 If the advice of counsel falls short of the consti-
tutional minimum, the plea itself is vulnerable for lack of the requisite
244. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Blackburn, 653 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981).
245. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); see also Passman v. Blackburn,
652 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1981).
246. United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
247. Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981).
248. Clark v. Blackburn, 632 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1980).
249. Ogle v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1981).
250. United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1980).
251. Many other issues, beyond the scope of this article, are raised in challenges to guilty
pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Block, 660 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Jackson, 659 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1981); Ehl v. Estelle, 656 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
Bryan, 645 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Law, 633 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 2332 (1981). Exclusion here does not suggest that these issues are any less
significant. See note 17 supra. Indeed, the court met en banc during the survey period to
consider the role of a state trial judge in guilty plea negotiations. Frank v. Blackburn, 646
F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
252. See generally Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970); Bradbury v. Wain-
wright, 658 F.2d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1981) (cases cited).
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knowing, voluntary, and informed waiver of constitutional rights.2 " T1
demonstrate a counsel deprivation, a defendant must show that the ad
vice "was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys ii
criminal cases.' "254 As in other areas of claimed ineffectiveness, the total
ity of the circumstances evaluation means a case-by-case consideration."5
Claims of ineffective counsel may also be based upon the duty of de
fense attorneys to know the applicable substantive and procedural law
When evaluating an attorney's total performance against a fundamenta
fairness measure, it is rare that "a single. error is so substantial that i
alone causes the attorney's assistance to fall below the sixth amendmen
standard."2 56 Often such claims are based on counsel misinforming thl
defendant concerning potential sentencing options during plea negotia
tions,257 although other legal issues also may be the basis.258 The cour
made clear that clairvoyance is not necessary: "[A] failure of counsel t4
be aware of prior controlling precedents in even a single prejudicial in
stance might render counsel's assistance ineffective under the Sixt
Amendment. However, counsel is normally not expected to foresee futurl
new developments in the law or for that matter to research parallel juris
dictions .... ",59
The final category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be dis
cussed involves defense attorney conflicts of interests. Joint representa
tion of codefendants is not per se unconstitutional, although there seeml
to be no good reason, beyond defense attorney economics and judicial fa
cility, to permit one attorney to represent two defendants.."O In the Fiftl
253. Grantling v. Balkcom, 632 F.2d 1261, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Henderson
549 F.2d 995, 996-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840 (1977); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.24
717, 725 (5th Cir. 1976).
254. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973), quoted in Beckham v. Wainwright
639 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1981).
255. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v
Aguilera, 654 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981); Hill v. Estelle, 653 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson V
Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1981)
256. Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979).
257. Dozier v. United States Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1981); Hill v. Estelle, 65:
F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1981); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1981).
258. Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending) (evidence law)
Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1981) (evidence law); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2(
125 (5th Cir. 1974) (element of offense missing).
259. Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 908 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original); see alsi
Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1972).
260. See generally Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 43
U.S. 475 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 569 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1978). See also generall,
Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEo. L.J
1075 (1979); Wanat, Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases and the Right to Effective As
sistance of Counsel-The Need for Change, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 57 (1978).
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Circuit only a conflict that is actual and not speculative fails the sixth
amendment standard. "An actual conflict exists if counsel's introduction
of probative evidence or plausible arguments that would significantly
benefit one defendant would damage the defense of another defendant
whom the same counsel is representing."' 6 1 In Baty v. Balkcom,262 the
Fifth Circuit considered the viability of a corollary rule. Fifth Circuit pre-
cedent had established that generally once an actual conflict of interest is
demonstrated, prejudice must be presumed without further inquiry.'" In
Cuyler v. Sullivan,' the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that a sixth
amendment claimant must establish both actual conflict of interest and
the adverse effect of that conflict on counsel's performance.'" The Baty
majority26  resolved any suggestion of ambiguity in the Supreme Court
opinionl' 7 by reaffirming the Fifth Circuit presumption of prejudice
corollary. 68
Application of these principles during the survey period involved recur-
ring problems of joint representation. A conflict existed when the defense
attorney was presented with an uncalled prospective witness who would
have been willing to testify that he robbed the store while defendant, co-
defendant, and a third party remained in the getaway car. This account
conflicted with the codefendant's alibi defense, but would have aided de-
fendant's attack on the eyewitness identification.26 The sixth amendment
was violated when one attorney represented two defendants who each
would testify exonerating himself and implicating the other and when the
joint representation prevented both from plea bargaining.270 Not all invo-
cations of the sixth amendment conflict doctrine are successful. When the
defendant and the defense attorney deny a conflict of interest or insist on
261. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1981). This test is entrenched firmly in
Fifth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Turnquest v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1981);
Johnson v. Hopper, 639 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending); United States v. Free-
man, 619 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); Zuck v. Alabama, 588
F.2d 436 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d
1072 (5th Cir. 1975).
262. 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981).
263. Id. at 395 (citing Turnquest v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 1981) and
Johnson v. Hopper, 639 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending)).
264. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
265. See 446 U.S. at 348.
266. Judge Fay concurred specially and abstained from the Cuyler interpretation. 661
F.2d at 398 (Fay, J., concurring).
267. See 446 U.S. at 358 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
268. 661 F.2d at 396-97. See also Turnquest v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 331, 333-34 (5th
Cir. 1981).
269. Turnquest v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1981).
270. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Johnson v. Hopper, 639 F.2d
236 (5th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending) (three codefendants).
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continuing despite this possibility, appellate allegations of conflict of in
terest are probably simple allegations and of no consequence.2 71
VII. CONCLUSION
In retrospect, this was a typical year for the Fifth Circuit. While th(
Constitution limits the role of the federal judiciary by its historic notion,
of the judicial role, separation of powers, and federalism,2 7 2 the Fifth Cir.
cuit's caseload in constitutional criminal procedure is anything bui
limited. The variety and quantity of decisions and issues defies even
Bohemian survey.273
271. See United States v. Crossman, 663 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bur
roughs, 650 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1981).
272. See Baker, Constitutional Law, 28 Loy. L. REV. 805, 805-22 (1982).
273. "Points more than all the lawyers in Bohemia can learning handle." W. Shake
speare, Winter's Tale Act IV, Scene IV, line 205.
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